Campaign-style enforcement and regulatory compliance

Nicole Ning Liu, Carlos Wing Hung Lo, Xueyong Zhan, Wei Wang

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

68 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article examines the recoupling mechanism of campaign-style enforcement and its effects on environmental regulatory compliance. Drawing on the policy implementation literature and institutional theory, the authors develop a conceptual model of campaign-style enforcement in which both resource mobilization and power redistribution are theorized to address decoupling problems in regulatory compliance. The two-pathway recoupling mechanism is evidenced by an empirical investigation of the implementation of China's energy conservation and emission reduction policy as part of that country's 11th Five-Year Plan. Findings suggest that campaign-style enforcement can effectively improve regulatory compliance when it addresses the efficiency/legitimacy conflict by providing policy incentives and reorganizing a clear hierarchy of political authority. The article concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of campaign-style enforcement.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)85-95
Number of pages11
JournalPublic Administration Review
Volume75
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration
  • Marketing

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