TY - JOUR
T1 - Buffer space hedging enabled production time variation coordination in prefabricated construction
AU - Zhai, Yue
AU - Xu, Gangyan
AU - Huang, George Q.
N1 - Funding Information:
This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 71901023 and 71804034 , and Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of Beijing Jiaotong University ( 2019RCW005 ).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2019/11
Y1 - 2019/11
N2 - In this paper, an on-site production time variation coordination is studied between a general contractor and a building contractor. To entice the building contractor to reduce its production time variation, which improves system performance but adds more pressure to the building contractor, a buffer space hedging (BSH) method is offered by the general contractor. The BSH is to reserve more spare space at an intermediate warehouse and serves for contingency usage. It can be an incentive for the building contractor because he is always confronted with site congestion, which is the major causes of serious project time and cost overrun. Four decision scenarios are investigated and compared: (1) an on-site production time variation reduction (OPTVR) coordination model; (2) a BSH coordination model; (3) a Nash game model denoting an equal bargaining power setting; and (4) a building contractor led Stackelberg game model. Closed-form expressions of the optimal OPTVR amount, the BSH amount, and the profit-sharing rate are derived. Comparative analysis reveals that the proposed game mechanisms can mitigate the pressure caused by adopting the OPTVR. Numerical studies further demonstrate that a win-win outcome is reached in two game models. Especially, the Nash game outperforms the Stackelberg game, and the building contractor benefits more from the mechanism than the general contractor.
AB - In this paper, an on-site production time variation coordination is studied between a general contractor and a building contractor. To entice the building contractor to reduce its production time variation, which improves system performance but adds more pressure to the building contractor, a buffer space hedging (BSH) method is offered by the general contractor. The BSH is to reserve more spare space at an intermediate warehouse and serves for contingency usage. It can be an incentive for the building contractor because he is always confronted with site congestion, which is the major causes of serious project time and cost overrun. Four decision scenarios are investigated and compared: (1) an on-site production time variation reduction (OPTVR) coordination model; (2) a BSH coordination model; (3) a Nash game model denoting an equal bargaining power setting; and (4) a building contractor led Stackelberg game model. Closed-form expressions of the optimal OPTVR amount, the BSH amount, and the profit-sharing rate are derived. Comparative analysis reveals that the proposed game mechanisms can mitigate the pressure caused by adopting the OPTVR. Numerical studies further demonstrate that a win-win outcome is reached in two game models. Especially, the Nash game outperforms the Stackelberg game, and the building contractor benefits more from the mechanism than the general contractor.
KW - Game theory
KW - Operational hedging
KW - Prefabricated construction
KW - Supply chain coordination
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85072869994&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.cie.2019.106082
DO - 10.1016/j.cie.2019.106082
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85072869994
VL - 137
JO - Computers and Industrial Engineering
JF - Computers and Industrial Engineering
SN - 0360-8352
M1 - 106082
ER -