TY - GEN
T1 - Bounded Rationality Optimizes the Performance of Networked Systems in Prisoner's Dilemma Game
AU - Xu, Xiongrui
AU - Rong, Zhihai
AU - Tse, Chi Kong
N1 - Funding Information:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61473060 and 71731004), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant No. ZYGX2016J192) and Hong Kong Scholars Program (Grants No. XJ2013019 and No. G-YZ4D), and the Open Project Program of State Key Laboratory of Theoretical Physics, Institute of Theoretical Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China (No.Y5KF201CJ1), Major Project of the National Social Science Grant (No.12-ZD218).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2018/4/26
Y1 - 2018/4/26
N2 - The bounded rationality of agents plays an important role in the performance of complex systems. In this work, we explore the influence of bounded rationality on the evolution of cooperation, defection and extortion strategies on a regular lattice by applying the Fermi dynamics in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. It is found that the rationality level plays a non-trivial role in the emergence of cooperation with extortion in structured systems. On the one hand, for the perfect rationality case, it is difficult for cooperators to resist the invasion of defection. On the other hand, being too irrational breaks the stable structure between cooperators and extortioners, and results in the extinction of cooperation. Hence, there is a proper level of bounded rationality which can slow down the expansion of defective and extortionate behaviors, and promote the emergence of cooperation-extortion alliances, which can yield a better outcome to the whole system. This study may provide some clues to optimize the performance of multi-agent systems with bounded rationality.
AB - The bounded rationality of agents plays an important role in the performance of complex systems. In this work, we explore the influence of bounded rationality on the evolution of cooperation, defection and extortion strategies on a regular lattice by applying the Fermi dynamics in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. It is found that the rationality level plays a non-trivial role in the emergence of cooperation with extortion in structured systems. On the one hand, for the perfect rationality case, it is difficult for cooperators to resist the invasion of defection. On the other hand, being too irrational breaks the stable structure between cooperators and extortioners, and results in the extinction of cooperation. Hence, there is a proper level of bounded rationality which can slow down the expansion of defective and extortionate behaviors, and promote the emergence of cooperation-extortion alliances, which can yield a better outcome to the whole system. This study may provide some clues to optimize the performance of multi-agent systems with bounded rationality.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85055606615&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ISCAS.2018.8351860
DO - 10.1109/ISCAS.2018.8351860
M3 - Conference article published in proceeding or book
AN - SCOPUS:85055606615
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems
BT - 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2018 - Proceedings
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2018
Y2 - 27 May 2018 through 30 May 2018
ER -