Bargaining models in opinion dynamics

Xi Zheng, Xi Lu, Tung Sun Chan, Yong Deng, Zhen Wang

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

How to reach consensus is the central problem in the research of opinion dynamics. Here we propose the bargaining models under the framework of game theory to involve the non-linearity of opinion dynamics. In this new setup, a dynamic bargaining power is presented to represent the individual difference, which can help to evaluate the profit of changing opinion. Moreover, two types of bargaining models are proposed due to the difference of choosing neighbors. Via numerous simulations, it is unveiled that, with an appropriate environment, both models could lead to the consensus in majority cases, which further enriches the context of opinion dynamics.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)162-168
Number of pages7
JournalApplied Mathematics and Computation
Volume251
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 15 Jan 2015

Keywords

  • Bargaining power
  • Bayesian updating rule
  • Consensus
  • Game theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computational Mathematics
  • Applied Mathematics

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