An approximately strategy-proof mechanism for radio spectrum allocation

Qinhui Wang, Baoliu Ye, Bolei Zhang, Sanglu Lu, Song Guo

Research output: Chapter in book / Conference proceedingConference article published in proceeding or bookAcademic researchpeer-review

Abstract

In wireless networks, a recent trend is to make spectrum access dynamic for the sake of efficient utilization of spectrum. In this case, one promising approach is using auction-based market mechanism where available channels are periodically allocated to users. Two of the key objectives in designing an auction mechanism are strategy-proofness and social welfare maximization. It is hard to design a practical auction achieving both objectives. Prior work either do not consider strategy-proofness or do not guarantee performance ratio. In this paper, we achieve a tradeoff between supporting strong strategy-proofness and maximizing social welfare. We design a polynomial-time spectrum auction mechanism that is approximately strategy-proof which bounds the profit gain of a bidder from a lying bid, and yields an allocation with approximate social welfare. Through simulations, we show that our mechanism improves performance by about 30% in terms of social welfare and spectrum utilization, compared to the state-of-art mechanisms.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC
PublisherIEEE
Pages1620-1625
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781479930838
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event2014 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2014 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: 6 Apr 20149 Apr 2014

Conference

Conference2014 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2014
CountryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period6/04/149/04/14

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this