Abstract
A game-theoretical model is developed in the context of the regulated multi-airport system (MAS), examining the regulator's policy in airport slot allocation and airlines' airport entry decisions. The regulator has a mixing objective to put different weights on passenger surplus and airports/airlines' profits. It can choose to intervene in airline allocation (that is, one-airport-one-airline rule) or not. It is found when the regulator does not intervene in airline allocation, airlines choose to enter both airports bringing about higher welfare. However, the regulator would intervene if it puts a sufficiently high weight on airports/airlines' profits.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 156-189 |
| Number of pages | 34 |
| Journal | Journal of Transport Economics and Policy |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2022 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Transportation
- Economics and Econometrics
- Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law