Airport-airline Relationship, Competition and Welfare in a Multi-airport System The Case of New Beijing Daxing Airport

Meng Hou, Kun Wang, Hangjun Yang, Anming Zhang

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A game-theoretical model is developed in the context of the regulated multi-airport system (MAS), examining the regulator's policy in airport slot allocation and airlines' airport entry decisions. The regulator has a mixing objective to put different weights on passenger surplus and airports/airlines' profits. It can choose to intervene in airline allocation (that is, one-airport-one-airline rule) or not. It is found when the regulator does not intervene in airline allocation, airlines choose to enter both airports bringing about higher welfare. However, the regulator would intervene if it puts a sufficiently high weight on airports/airlines' profits.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)156-189
Number of pages34
JournalJournal of Transport Economics and Policy
Volume56
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2022
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Transportation
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

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