A Stackelberg game framework for resource management in the CloudPoS-Based blockchain network

Chunqiao Tan, Li Zhou, Y. P. Tsang, Chao He, Huijuan Yang

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

Abstract

This paper proposes a two-stage Stackelberg game framework to study resource management in a CloudPoS-based blockchain network, analyzes multiple factors’ impact on optimal strategies and profits of cloud service provider (CSP) and miners. The results show that the proposed model can maximize the profits of CSP and miners, the fixed reward, the total supply, and the propagation delay have a monotonic impact on miners’ decisions, but a non-monotonic impact on CSP’s decisions; the number of miners has a non-monotonic impact on both decisions. Our findings emphasize that the CSP should control the number of miners participating in cloud mining and the total supply of resources.

Original languageEnglish
Article number2256005
JournalEnterprise Information Systems
Volume18
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2024

Keywords

  • blockchain
  • cloud computing
  • price decision
  • proof-of-stake
  • Stackelberg game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Information Systems and Management

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