A High-Order Differentiator Based Distributed Secondary Control for DC Microgrids Against False Data Injection Attacks

Yajie Jiang, Yun Yang, Siew Chong Tan, Shu Yuen Ron Hui

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

28 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Conventional distributed secondary control is vulnerable to the false data injection (FDI) attacks in regulating power electronics (PE)-based DC microgrids. To address this issue, a sliding mode observer (SMO) based distributed secondary control has been proposed to detect and compensate the FDI signals. However, the SMO suffers from inevitable chattering that deteriorates the steady-state performance. To this end, a high-order differentiator (HoD) based distributed secondary control is proposed in this paper. The proposed control can not only eliminate the chattering, but also improve the dynamics with shorter settling time. It is inherited from the conventional distributed control by only requiring neighboring communication to provide references for the primary-layer control in achieving bus voltage restorations, output current sharing, and output power sharing of PE-based systems. Both simulation and experimental results have verified that the proposed control can compensate different types of FDI attacks and showcase its superior dynamic performance than SMO without chattering.

Original languageEnglish
JournalIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 16 Nov 2021

Keywords

  • Biological system modeling
  • DC microgrid.
  • Distributed databases
  • distributed secondary control
  • false data injection (FDI)
  • High-order differentiator (HoD)
  • Microgrids
  • Monitoring
  • Observers
  • Peer-to-peer computing
  • power electronics (PE)-based systems
  • Voltage control

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Computer Science

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