Abstract
In recent years secret permutations have been widely used for protecting different types of multimedia data, including speech files, digital images and videos. Based on a general model of permutation-only multimedia ciphers, this paper performs a quantitative cryptanalysis on the performance of these kind of ciphers against plaintext attacks. When the plaintext is of size M × N and with L different levels of values, the following quantitative cryptanalytic findings have been concluded under the assumption of a uniform distribution of each element in the plaintext: (1) all permutation-only multimedia ciphers are practically insecure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks in the sense that only O (logL(MN)) known/chosen plaintexts are sufficient to recover not less than (in an average sense) half elements of the plaintext; (2) the computational complexity of the known/chosen-plaintext attack is only O (n · (MN)2), where n is the number of known/chosen plaintexts used. When the plaintext has a non-uniform distribution, the number of required plaintexts and the computational complexity is also discussed. Experiments are given to demonstrate the real performance of the known-plaintext attack for a typical permutation-only image cipher.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 212-223 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Signal Processing: Image Communication |
Volume | 23 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2008 |
Keywords
- Chosen-plaintext attack
- Cryptanalysis
- Image
- Known-plaintext attack
- Permutation-only multimedia encryption
- Speech
- Video
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Signal Processing
- Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering