A Game Theoretical Incentive Scheme for Relay Selection Services in Mobile Social Networks

Qichao Xu, Zhou Su, Song Guo

Research output: Journal article publicationJournal articleAcademic researchpeer-review

99 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Rapid developments in mobile services and wireless technologies have prompted users to form mobile social networks (MSNs), where bundles can be delivered via opportunistic peer-to-peer links in a store-carry-forward mode. This mode needs all nodes to work in a cooperative way. However, mobile nodes may be selfish and might not be willing to forward data to others due to the limited resources (e.g., buffer and energy), resulting in degraded system performance. To tackle the aforementioned problem, this paper proposes a novel incentive scheme to stimulate selfish nodes to participate in bundle delivery in MSNs. At first, a virtual currency is introduced to pay for the relay service. Then, a bundle carrier selects a relay node from its friends or other strangers based on its status. Next, a bargain game is employed to model the transaction pricing for relay service. In addition, the simulation results show that the proposal can improve the performance of the existing schemes significantly.
Original languageEnglish
Article number7219474
Pages (from-to)6692-6702
Number of pages11
JournalIEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
Volume65
Issue number8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Bundle delivery
  • mobile social networks (MSNs)
  • relay selection
  • ubiquitous service

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Automotive Engineering
  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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