A game-theoretical approach for modeling competitions in a maritime supply chain

Liying Song; Dong Yang; Anthony Theng Heng Chin; Guangzhi Zhang; Zhengbing He; Wei Guan; Baohua Mao

doi:10.1080/03088839.2016.1231427

A game-theoretical approach for modeling competitions in a maritime supply chain

Liying Song, Dong Yang, Anthony Theng Heng Chin, Guangzhi Zhang, Zhengbing He, Wei Guan, Baohua Mao

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Research output: Journal article publication › Journal article › Academic research › peer-review

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

To accommodate the structural changes in logistics, competitions along a maritime supply chain are more intensive than before. This paper adopts a two-stage noncooperative game-theoretical approach to model the horizontal and vertical interactions among liners and ports. In the first stage, Bertrand game is applied to model the interactions between two liners. When the shipping line decides which port to call, a multinomial Logit model is applied. In the second stage, Bertrand game is applied to model the competitions between two ports. Nash equilibrium is derived by solving the Bertrand games. A numerical example is provided as a case study.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	976-991
Number of pages	16
Journal	Maritime Policy and Management
Volume	43
Issue number	8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/03088839.2016.1231427
Publication status	Published - 16 Nov 2016

Keywords

Bertrand game
competition
equilibrium
Game theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Geography, Planning and Development
Transportation
Ocean Engineering
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

More information

10.1080/03088839.2016.1231427

http://hdl.handle.net/10397/98366

Cite this

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AU - Guan, Wei

AU - Mao, Baohua

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AB - To accommodate the structural changes in logistics, competitions along a maritime supply chain are more intensive than before. This paper adopts a two-stage noncooperative game-theoretical approach to model the horizontal and vertical interactions among liners and ports. In the first stage, Bertrand game is applied to model the interactions between two liners. When the shipping line decides which port to call, a multinomial Logit model is applied. In the second stage, Bertrand game is applied to model the competitions between two ports. Nash equilibrium is derived by solving the Bertrand games. A numerical example is provided as a case study.

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A game-theoretical approach for modeling competitions in a maritime supply chain

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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