TY - JOUR
T1 - A game theoretical analysis of metro-integrated city logistics systems
AU - Ma, Mingyou
AU - Zhang, Fangni
AU - Liu, Wei
AU - Dixit, Vinayak
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees very much for their useful comments, which helped improve both the technical quality and exposition of this paper substantially. This study was partly supported by Research Grants Council of Hong Kong, China (No. 27202221 ), National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72101222 ), and the Australian Research Council ( DE200101793 ).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2022/2
Y1 - 2022/2
N2 - The spare capacity of metro systems during non-peak hours can be utilized to transport parcels or freight, i.e., metro-integrated logistics systems (MILS). Existing studies regarding MILS mainly focused on operational level issues, e.g., parcel distribution problem and service scheduling problem. Little has been done to understand the strategic interactions between metro and logistics operators in the context of MILS and the resulting system-wide impacts. This study conducts a game theoretical analysis of MILS, where a metro company and a logistics company may work either independently or jointly (non-cooperative or cooperative games). In particular, the logistic company decides the number of parcels assigned to MILS, and the metro company controls the price of the MILS service. We examine the decisions of the metro company and the logistics company under different market power regimes, and quantify the system performance. Numerical studies are conducted to illustrate the analytical observations and provide further understanding. Our results show that introducing MILS has the potential to generate Pareto-improving outcomes for the metro company and the logistics company.
AB - The spare capacity of metro systems during non-peak hours can be utilized to transport parcels or freight, i.e., metro-integrated logistics systems (MILS). Existing studies regarding MILS mainly focused on operational level issues, e.g., parcel distribution problem and service scheduling problem. Little has been done to understand the strategic interactions between metro and logistics operators in the context of MILS and the resulting system-wide impacts. This study conducts a game theoretical analysis of MILS, where a metro company and a logistics company may work either independently or jointly (non-cooperative or cooperative games). In particular, the logistic company decides the number of parcels assigned to MILS, and the metro company controls the price of the MILS service. We examine the decisions of the metro company and the logistics company under different market power regimes, and quantify the system performance. Numerical studies are conducted to illustrate the analytical observations and provide further understanding. Our results show that introducing MILS has the potential to generate Pareto-improving outcomes for the metro company and the logistics company.
KW - Cooperative game
KW - Metro system
KW - MILS
KW - Non-cooperative game
KW - Parcel transportation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85122328181&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.trb.2021.12.005
DO - 10.1016/j.trb.2021.12.005
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85122328181
SN - 0191-2615
VL - 156
SP - 14
EP - 27
JO - Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
JF - Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
ER -