Abstract
We construct a cooperative staffing game to investigate how to fairly allocate a reduced number of staff among multiple call centers that pool (centralize) their capacities. We show that this game is essential and submodular, and, thereby, convex with a non-empty core. We also propose a neat Shapley value-characterized staff-allocation rule, which exists in the core of the game.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 490-493 |
Number of pages | 4 |
Journal | Operations Research Letters |
Volume | 41 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 11 Jul 2013 |
Keywords
- Call center pooling
- Cooperative game
- Shapley value
- Square-root safety staffing rule
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
- Applied Mathematics